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INTRODUCTION
The current decade has brought yet another transformation in the
practice and study of human resource management (HRM). The field, for
better or for worse, has discovered, and indeed begun to embrace, a
strategic perspective. The intellectual energy currently being invested
in discussions of the nature, extent, and desirability of this development
is a clear indication that something of significance is afoot. Understand
it or not, believe in it or not, like it or not, strategy is well on its
way to becoming an important paradigm behind much of what HR professionals
do and think.
How is this paradigm different from earlier ones that have driven
the development of the field? While observers differ on the details, there
is a fair amount of agreeement on the critical distinctions (Mahoney and
Deckop, 1986). These organize around four major themes: level, focus,
framework, and roles:
Level: Since strategies involves decisions about key
goals, major policies, and the allocation of resources,
they tend to be formulated at the top. This contrasts
with the design and implementation of personnel programs
or activities (e.g., training sessions or job evaluation
plans), usually done by middle-level personnel
specialists, and the day-to-day administration of
policies and programs, usually carried out by line
managers at various levels assisted by middle- to lower-
level personnel generalists (Tichy, Fombrun, and
Devanna, 1982).
2Focus: strategies are business-driven, and the focus
is on organizational effectiveness; thus, in this
perspective people are seen primarily as resources
to be managed toward the achievement of strategic
business goals. The more traditional perspective
emphasizes HR outcomes (e.g., performance, turnover,
job satisfaction) or, more often, programs or activities
and tends to view people, or at least their behaviors
and attitudes, as ends in and of themselves (Mahoney
and Deckop, 1986).
Framework: strategies by their very nature represent
unifying frameworks which are at once broad,
contingency-based, and integrative. They incorporate
a full complement of human resource goals and activities
designed specifically to fit extant environments and
to be mutually reinforcing or synergistic. This is
quite different from the usual approach which treats
personnel programs or activities more or less in
isolation, both from their environments and from one
another.
Roles: As the foregoing suggests, strategy-making is generally
the responsibility of line managers, with personnel playing a
supportive role. Traditionally, in HRM the role of line managers
has been downplayed in deference to the personnel function and
the professionals who staff it (Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Mills,
and Walton, 1984).
3While it is impossible to say just how thoroughly the strategic
perspective has permeated HRM, the available evidence suggests a movement
in the making. Certainly, it has ma~e deep inroads into the professional
journals, particularly those that are practitioner oriented and even more
particularly those that are aimed at HR planners (see, for example, any
recent issue of Personnel Journal, Human Resource Management, or Human
Resource Planning). Several recent books on HRM (Beer, et ai, 1984;
Fombrun, Tichy and Devanna, 1984; Foulkes, 1986; Lawler, 1986) have a
strategic focus. There has been a little published research (for reviews,
see Dyer 1984, 1985), and more such work is underway (DeBejar and Milkovich,
1985; Schuler and Jackson, 1987(b».
The topic of strategy has become obligatory at major meetings where
HR professionals gather to talk shop. An increasing number of HR
consultants are hawking their recently acquired strategic expertise. A
few companies -- IBM, G.E., Hewlett Packard, Eli Lilly, Marion Laboratories,
Lincoln Electric, and United Parcel Service (UPS), for example -- have
garnered considerable status as a result of their strategic approaches
to HRM. Still others -- Chaparral Steel, New United Motors Manufacturing,
Inc. (NUMMI), Motorola, Federal Express, and (perhaps unfortunately) People
Express -- have more recently generated considerable publicity for their
efforts along these lines. Many others are no doubt making more quiet
forays into the strategic waters. Certainly, this view is supported by
the available surveys (Heidrick and Struggles, 1984).
What lies behind this flurry of activity? Much can be attributed
to business necessity. The past ten years have been particularly
challenging for American business. In the rush to competitiveness a great
4many firms have been forced to rethink and recast their basic business
strategies. As a consequence, all organizational resources, including
human resources, have come under close scrutiny. While in many cases this
initially led to piecemeal (and sometimes draconian) responses, over the
longer run it has also apparently encouraged at least a few firms to engage
in a deeper level of thought and action. For some, the natural outcome
of this introspection has been a more strategic approach to the management
of people.
On its own, the force of business necessity may not have turned the
tide, but it has been aided and abetted in a couple of important ways.
First, this decade has witnessed a steady erosion in the influence of
factors which traditionally have given HR professionals much of their raison
d'etre. In particular, the labor movement has continued to lose much of
its punch and, most notably at the federal level, both the promulgation
and enforcement of laws and regulations have withered. For some, then,
strategy has come to be viewed a means, and indeed a particularly convenient
and salient means, of filling this vacuum. Further, the time and resources
thus freed have been available to pursue this not altogether unattractive
possibility sometimes (as noted) with considerable success.
A second facilitative force, never to be underestimated, is the
pervasive bandwagon effect. Certainly one result of the aforementioned
activity is to generate yet more activity. If strategy represents the
cutting-edge, what company, what HR professional wants, or can afford,
to be left behind?
Thus primed by a fortunate confluence of events and fueled by a steady
stream of exhortatations, success stories, and insecurities has the
5strategic perspective rapidly worked its way into the consciousness of
the HR community, and by extension many line managers.
The purpose of this chapter is to pause and reflect on these
developments. Initially this involves a further exploration of the concept
of strategy and its offshoot, strategic HRM. From there, attention turns
to a fuller analysis of the evolution of events that have brought us to
where we seem to be; here the major message is that the current interest
in strategy is neither accidental nor particularly unwarranted, but rather
a natural and perhaps even predictable progression of the field. From
this point, at the risk of seemingly imposing order on chaos, the chapter
takes an in-depth look at three specific strategic types which appear to
be especially well formulated and successful. This is done not to tout
these particular approaches, but to provide specific examples of what is
actually going on. Following this, notice is taken of the evolving role
of the HR function and HR professionals in organizations adopting a more
strategic perspective. Finally, the chapter closes with a bit of
speculation about what lies ahead and draws some implications for
practioners and students of HRM.
STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Broadly, strategies indicate the goals that key organizational
decision-makers intend (or hope) to accomplish and, to some extent at least,
how they-intend to accomplish them. In large companies strategies occur
at three levels: at corporate, within divisions or strategic business
units, and within various functions (Schendel & Hofer, 1979). The first
indicates the businesses an enterprise intends to pursue, the second how
6it intends to compete in each of these businesses (e.9., by becoming a
low cost producer or a highly innovative product developer), and the third
the contributions each major function (e.g., marketing, manufacturing,
and research and development) is expected to make to each business's
competitive strategy. Obviously, all three types of strategies (hereafter
collectively referred to as business strategies) often contain HR issues
and implications.
strategic HRM consists of three major tasks. The first, which occurs
during the formulation of business strategies, is to assure that extant
HR issues and implications are fully considered as various alternatives
or proposals are weighed. The second, and subsequent, task involves the
establishment of HR goals and action plans -- that is to say, HR strategies
-- in support of the business strategies being pursued (Dyer, 1983). And
the third, and final, task is to work with line managers as principal
clients to assure that established action plans are indeed implemented.
To carry out the first task, each potentially serious strategic
proposal is assessed in terms of its feasibility and desirability from
an HR perspective. Feasibility is judged by determining: (1) whether or
not the numbers and types of key people required to make the proposal a
success can be obtained on a timely basis and at a reasonable cost (or
those no longer needed can be reallocated or released quickly and cheaply
enough) and (2) whether or not the behavioral expectations (e.g., retention
rates and productivity levels) assumed by the strategy have some reasonable
chance of being met (Schuler, 1987).
Making these judgments, as Figure 1 suggests, requires an extensive
knowledge not only of the business strategies under consideration, including
7any implied or stated changes in the organizational environment (i.e.,
structures or technologies), but also of any constraining factors in the
organization's internal or external environments. When judging a proposal
to grow a business significantly through ongoing new product development,
for example, it would first be necessary to determine who the key personnel
are (e.g., researchers, process engineers) and then to estimate how many
the strategy would require (this, of course, necessitates assumptions about
their productivity). Next attention would turn to the internal supply
of the relevant talent and, allowing for likely turnover, an estimate of
their probable availability when needed. If shortfalls are indicated,
the resort is to external labor markets to determine how likely it is that
the anticipated deficiencies could be made up through external hiring on
a timely and affordable basis. (For more on this type of HR planning see
Chapter II of this volume.)
-----------------------
Figure 1 about here
------------------------
Simultaneously, the matter of desirability is addressed. Here the
implications of strategic proposals are examined in terms of sacrosanct
HR policies or conditions. A strategy of rapid retrenchment, for example,
would be called into question at a company with a full employment policy
if it were unclear that the required employee dislocations could be
accomplished without layoffs. Or a proposal that calls for rapid increases
in productivity would be flagged in many companies' if the heightened
pressure on employees might cause morale problems and a propensity to
unionize. Or a strategy dependent on a new technology involving previously
8unused chemicals would be contraindicated if there was a chance of possibly
serious health risks to employees.
Desirability, even more than feasibility, is a judgment call. But,
again, the same basic information is required: a thorough knowledge of
the business proposal, including its organizational and technological
implications, and a data base of existing and expected conditions in the
organization's internal and external environments (for specifics on
analyzing the latter, see Chapter III of this volume).
When an investigation suggests that a particular proposal is
potentially infeasible or undesirable from an HR perspective, it is
rethought. This does not mean, of course, that it is necessarily scrapped
or even altered. other more compelling and thus overriding considerations
may outweigh HR concerns (adverse business conditions, for example, have
recently led to layoffs in some companies -- e.g., Kodak, Control Data,
and Data General -- which previously had touted themselves as full
employment companies). But, even when HR concerns do not carry the day
the analyses that were conducted can still be useful during the next major
task in strategic HRM, the formulation of a supporting HR strategy.
This, as previously suggested, involves decisions concerning major
HR goals and the primary means that will be used to pursue these goals.
While HR goals and means are necessarily situation specific, a generic
set of areas that might be considered is presented in Figure 2 (the goals
are in the inner circle and the means in the two outer ones). These areas
are defined in Exhibits 1 and 2.
9--------------------------------------
Figure 2 and Exhibits 1 & 2 about here
--------------------------------------
HR goals define the main issues to be worked on. Not surprisingly,
they derive primarily from the content of the business strategy, although
often they are tempered by what is known about other relevant environments
(refer again to Figure 1). To cite an example, many businesses these days
are striving to become lower (if not the lowest) cost producers. This
typically requires, among other things, reducing labor costs which, in
turn, often translates into at least two types of HR goals: higher
performance standards (contribution) and reduced headcounts (composition).
For some it may also translate into a third and fourth: maintaining employee
quality (competence) and morale (commitment) especially as the organization
begins to cut back on employees. Whether the latter two issues, in
particular, would be of concern might be influenced by such outside factors
as the labor market availability of replacement talent (in case of a
subsequent upturn) or the threat of unionization.
With HR goals in place, HR strategists are left with the chore of
deciding on means. Two matters are at issue. One involves priorities,
which ultimately are reflected in resource allocations, and the other major
policies. Priorities are necessary since few organizations can, or would
want to, put equal emphasis on all the program areas described in Exhibit
2. Major policies provide guidance to those who design the specific
programs or activities that underly the HR strategy.
To a large extent HR goals determine priorities and policies, although
there is certainly some latitude in the decision-making process. A company
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in search of high levels of routine performance from its employees, for
example, might emphasize the reward activity with a policy of offering
high levels of contingency based pay (e.g., through incentives, bonuses,
or gainsharing plans). Another company, more interested in inducing
initiative, creativity, and flexibility, however, might put its money on
work system design with an emphasis on employee participation (e.g., through
job enrichment or self-managing work teams).
The general rule (not universally ascribed to) is: the tighter the
external and internal fit, the better the strategy. In the present context,
external fit refers to the degree of consistency between HR goals on the
one hand and the exigencies of the underlying business strategy and other
relevant environmental conditions on the other. Internal fit refers both
to the extent to which HR means follow from HR goals and other relevant
environmental conditions and to the degree of coherency or synergy among
the various HR means. In some companies these conditions are clearly met
rather well, while in others they obviously are not.
One in which they are is Chaparral Steel (Forward, 1986). A so-called
mini-mill, the company's business strategy is to outdo the majors and the
importers through niche marketing, product innovation and low prices, made
possible by a very flat and flexible organization structure, the continuous
introduction of state-of-the art production technologies, and tight cost
controls.
Chaparral's HR strategy, which has evolved over time, features the
following goals: (1) high performance standards (a constant drive to do
"better") and expectations of initiative and creativity from all employees
(contribution); (2) minimal management (4 layers), minimal staffs, some
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slack at lower management levels (for flexibility), lean headcounts on
the production floor (composition); (3) high skill levels and considerable
personal flexibility (competence); and (4) high identification with the
company and its business goals (commitment).
To achieve these goals Chaparral has put in place a tightly integrated
set of HR activities. Greatest emphasis is placed on the work system and
a policy of participative management ("not consensus management", according
to one manager, "but [rather] driving decisions down to the lowest possible
level"). All research and development and quality control work, for
example, is done by line supervisors and production employees, not
specialized departments; supervisors are responsible for their own hiring,
training, and safety; production employees regularly serve on special
project teams to look after customer concerns and evaluate new technologies.
In the spirit of synergy, the work system is supported by very high
hiring standards (the company looks for "home grown entrepeneurs");
extensive training efforts (including sabbaticals); profit sharing (six
percent of pre-tax profits goes into the plan) and special bonuses for
extraordinary achievements; an active employee relations effort (featuring
constant communication about company goals and performance and an
egalitarian atmosphere -- no time clocks, all salaried employees, no
reserved parking, no fancy offices); and no union.
Chaparral is a highly productive company: labor costs run nine to
10 percent of sales, about one-fourth the industry standard; output per
person is a little over three times the industry average. Gordon Forward,
the CEO, attributes about 60 percent of the company's productivity advantage
to its advanced automation, and about 40 percent to its HR strategy.
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Results of this kind no doubt serve to reinforce the current interest
in HR strategy. But, as suggested earlier, it is apparent that the forces
behind the current surge go much deeper. For the evidence it is necessary
to take a brief trip down memory lane.
THE EVOLUTION TO STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Just as earlier preoccupations of HRM can be explained in terms of
the events of the time, so too with strategy. As noted previously, it
is not surprising that this particular paradigm has gained prominence during
the current decade. In a sense, it is an idea whose time has come.
As is now clear, an organization's HR strategy is the result of a
series of managerial decisions about priorities and policies designed either
to influence or to adapt to dominant environmental forces. Carrying this
logic to a more aggregate level suggests that broader developments in HRM
-- which are, after all, simply the sum of prevailing organizational
patterns -- emerge in much the same way. Once again, then, reference is
made to Figure 1 as a useful framework for examining, first, the evolution
of the forces acting on managerial decision-makers and then, the dominant
patterns in their responses. For brevity, the analysis is collapsed into
two broad time periods: the 30 to 35 years following World War II and the
current decade.
FROM THE FORTIES TO THE SEVENTIES
In retrospect the period from the mid-forties to about 1970 was a
golden age for American business. The demand for goods and services,
especially early on, was practically insatiable and the U.S. entered the
.3
1 in possession ot over one-halt the world's usable industrial capacit
. J:Huestone and J ~rlson, l~tl~). The name ot the game was produce and
aarket. Business strategies (the term m, be too grandiose for the realit)
:ocused on the maintenance of un intern
: dltterentlatlon, whlle not matters ot total indiffe
Isly otten second-level concerns.
Structurally, during this time, the drif1 ~as toward immense size,
:entralization, and bureaucratization; it was in the mid- sixties, it will
>e recalled, that J( 1 Kenneth Galbraith (1967) was first moved to ,
~ emerging "technostructure". There were a number ot important
:echnological breakthroughs, but more pertained to products than processes.
'erceived threats of widespread technological obsolescence ld displacemer
~ong blue-collar workers proved to be seriously overdrawn (Hunt and Hunt,
.983) .
Interestingly, this comfortable pat1 :n ot operation changed very
Little even well into the seventies. Unfortunately, however, the business
~nvironment did. Oil shocks and recessions took their toll. But, the
Longer-term challenge came tJ 1 toreign competition. In l':fIO,somewhere
lround 20 percent ot the goods produced in the U.S. were competing with
:oreign-made pr<
)t managements' tallure to adJust
.ng circumstances, American share ot world markets tell by ~j perc
turing thls decade (tllUestone and ~rlson, l~tl~, p. 140).
Just as business had prospered right after the war, so too had the
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American labor movement. In 1945, union membership reached 35 percent
of the nonagricultural labor force (and stayed at that level for over a
decade). Labor militance was also high; lost time due to strikes reached
uprecedented levels in the mid-forties and, at the time, it was feared
that this situation would continue.
Clearly, this was a vexing prospect for employers given the large
rewards they stood to reap from continuous and uninterrupted production.
Thus, there was great interest in preserving the golden goose. The
corresponding HR challenge was to find paths of accommodation and
stabilization in ongoing labor-management relations and to stave off the
unions where they had yet to make inroads.
By all accounts, it was a challenge admirably met. Top managers by
and large delegated the task to their newly-formed personnel departments.
Labor relations specialists were assigned responsibility for negotiating
and administering contracts in a manner satisfactory to both their bosses
and the unions; that is, without strikes or other disruptions. This they
learned to do, particularly (with a couple of major exceptions) during
the fifties, and with a few exceptions a general pattern of managed
adversarialism held sway in union-management relations well into the 1970s
(Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986).
At the same time, other personnel managers and specialists were at
work developing and expanding programs and procedures that had gained
acceptance during the war. These included job analysis, psychological
testing, technical training, job evaluation, and other techniques of wage
and salary administration (Jacoby, 1985). Much of this effort was aimed
at forestalling the spread of unions (Dunlop and Myers, 1955). But, it
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was also particularly well-suited to the large, centralized bureaucracies
of the time.
The sixties and, particularly, seventies brought a diminution of
labor's power. By 1970 union membership had dwindled to 27.3 percent of
the nonagricultural labor force and by 1980 it was down to 21.9 percent.
Organizing attempts declined and became increasingly less successful partly
because of managements' enhanced willingness and new-found capability to
resist unions in nonviolent ways.
As the influence of unions dwindled, the action picked up on the
legislative front. The litany of laws, Executive Orders, and regulations
promulgated by the federal government during the socially tumultuous sixties
and early seventies is legion: Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, EOs 11246 and 11375, the list goes on
and on. Between 1960 and 1975, according to one estimate, the number of
regulations administered by the U.S. Department of Labor tripled from 43
to 134 (Dunlop, 1976).
Enforcement of these statutes and directives reached full force during
the seventies. There were several sizable and highly publicized consent
decrees and judgments, many of behalf of women who were entering the labor
force in unprecedented numbers (Fullerton and Tschetter, 1983). In a survey
taken in the mid-seventies, personnel professionals singled out government
regulation as a major instigator of change in their organizations during
the previous decade (Janger, 1977).
Unfortunately, no similar survey was taken among top and other line
managers. As with the labor unions before, however, it appears that most,
the notably socially-conscious and legally vulnerable excepted, saw these
16
legal developments as somewhat less central and significant. Once again,
then, much of the action wound up in the hands of the ever-expanding
personnel departments. By the mid-seventies virtually all medium-sized
and large companies had established equal employment opportunity units
within their personnel functions (Janger, 1977). And, de novo, a cadre
of capable professionals had developed to carry out and champion the often
sophisticated analyses and actions required to meet or exceed the basic
legal requirements.
At the same time, of course, labor relations and other specialists
continued their activities. Despite a general preference among the former,
and their union counterparts, for the status quo (Freedman, 1979; Kochan,
1980), a few unionized, and no doubt a few more nonunionized, firms found
themselves experimenting with a host of activities -- quality circles,
quality of work life programs, and the like -- in attempts to bolster
productivity, enhance product quality, and improve employee morale (Kochan,
et ai, 1986, pp. 40-45). Also, greater attention was being given to care
and feeding of the burgeoning number of so-called knowledge workers in
the expanding high tech and service sectors. Many of these activities
were driven by an emerging sense of "professionalism" in the personnel
community and a concomitant desire to be on the "cutting-edge" of the field.
In general, however, the emphasis was on relatively dissociated programs
and practices rather than a broader concept of HR strategy (Tichy, et,
ai, 1982).
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INTO THE EIGHTIES
During the past 10 years, globalization has continued apace.
Deregulation has brought competition to the airlines, railroads, truckers,
bankers, telephone companies, oil and gas producers, and broadcasters.
Evolving technologies have blurred traditional industry lines and generated
competing products and services from unexpected sources. Institutional
investors and corporate raiders have become bolder and more assertive
thereby increasing the pressure on management to produce immediate financial
returns and constant increases in shareholder value. And there was a
worldwide recession.
In the face of these developments, some managements have sought refuge
in what Reich (1983) has called "paper entrepeneurialism" and "historic
preservation"; that is, in asset shuffling, protectionism, and even
reregulation. But many, too, however belatedly, have begun the process
of corporate revitalization. Change has been wrought in strategies,
structures, technologies, and processes. Business strategies have been
reformulated to assure that every product and service offers a clear
competitive advantage (e.g., low cost, high quality, a unique feature,
or an innovative application) (Porter, 1980). Firms of all sizes, but
particularly the huge bureaucracies of the post-war era, have been
restructured -- and often downsized; between 1980 and 1987, it is estimated,
about one-half the Fortune 1,000 firms experienced at least one significant
reorganization (Russell, 1987). Decentralization -- driving business
decisions out to operating units and down to the lowest feasible level
("getting back to the basics" and "close to the customer" in the vernacular)
-- has once again come into vogue.
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Huge investments (just how huge no one seems to know) have been made
in process technologies -- computer-aided design and manufacturing
(CAD/CAM), robotics, computer integrated manufacturing (CIM), point of
sale ordering and inventory systems, fault-tolerant transaction processing
systems, and multi-functional work stations, to name just a few -- in
attempts to increase efficiency, improve quality, and enhance flexibility
in manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, the service sector (Greenhouse,
1987; Pava, 1985; Walton, 1985(a); Zuboff, 1985). In recent years, new
technologies of this type are said to have altered the jobs of an estimated
40 to 50 million Americans, or about 40 percent of the civilian labor force
(Hoerr, Pollock and Whiteside, 1986).
Commensurate with these events, the labor movement has continued its
downward slide; union membership is now less than 18 percent of the
nonagricultural labor force. Competitive realities have forced a number
of large and visible unions to make significant concessions in wages,
benefits and work rules. In 1986, according to the Bureau of Labor
statistics, negotiated wage settlements reached record low levels for the
fifth consecutive year (Work, Seamonds and Black, 1986). strikes are
at their lowest point in forty years. Until very recently, organizing
was at a virtual standstill.
Consistent with the spirit of deregulation and rugged individualism,
the Reagan administration has neither instigated nor supported any major
legal initiatives in the HR arena. Enforcement-has lapsed. To some extent
the vacuum thus created has been filled by state governments and the courts
(Hoerr, Glaberson, Moskowitz, Cahan, Pollock and Tasini, 1985). But on
balance, thus far in the eighties the legal heat felt by employers has
19
been well below the level of the preceding decade.
The big HR challenge, then, has been keeping up with the changes on
the business front. One apparent effect of this has been an increasing
involvement by top and other line managers in HR matters. The early
impetus for this came when the initial moves toward competitiveness resulted
in HR implications -- especially massive layoffs, dislocations, and wage
and salary freezes and even cuts -- that were too far-reaching and serious
to ignore or delegate. The impetus has been sustained where enhanced
levels of contribution and commitment on the part of all employees have
become recognized as necessary conditions for business success.
Where this metamorphosis has occurred, the perhaps surprising result
has been an enlarged role for the personnel function. Increasingly,
personnel managers and specialists have been called upon to understand
the businesses in which they operate, be familiar with extant or evolving
business strategies, propose strategic HR solutions to strategic business
issues, and work closely with line management to implement these solutions.
This is quite different from having continually to press for action because
it is contractually or legally required or because it has been judged
appropriate from a professional point of view. Not surprisingly, the change
has proved to be not entirely comfortable for some personnel professionals
(a point covered in more depth later).
These new-found partnerships between line and staff have resulted
in a wealth of organizational experimentation. Some is relatively limited
in scope and aimed at fairly specific goals. At Federal Express, for
example, a systematic program of information, incentives, and controls
have been used to keep headcounts in line (Wagel, 1987). Several companies
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-- Digital Equipment, Hallmark, Pacific Bell, Worthington Industries --
have successfully redeployed and retrained significant portions of their
work forces to enhance performance without layoffs (Saporito, 1987). pay-
for-performance in the form of merit pay, bonuses, gain-sharing, and profit-
sharing has enjoyed a resurgence where employee motivation is a concern
(Lawler, 1986). Earlier experiments with employee participation through
quality circles, quality of worklife programs, semiautonomous work groups,
and self-managed work teams -- in the auto and steel industries, for example
-- have been expanded and diffused to a wide variety of firms and industries
(Port, 1987; Port and Wilson, 1987).
More extensive efforts are also underway. Virtually every manufacturer
that is committed to retaining production in this country has been forced
to undertake productivity and quality improvement programs of one type
or another. Some -- e.g., Outboard Marine -- have built new modular plants
in low-wage areas in the south. Others, such as Allen-Bradley, have made
substantial investments in new technologies and in the people who install
and operate them. Still others have put their money mainly on human
resources (Lawler, 1986; Walton, 1985(b». A typical example of the latter
is NUMMI, the joint venture between General Motors and Toyota in California.
Here, in "partnership" with the United Auto Workers, the emphasis is on
participative management -- semiautonomous work groups, open
communications, extensive training -- in combination with Japanese
production techniques. The plant, which General Motors once closed because
of labor and production problems, now regularly outperforms more
technologically advanced facilities in terms of both productivity and
quality (Bernstein and Zellner, 1987; Levine, 1986).
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As these various forms of experimentation take hold, they begin to
create internal anomolies that require still more changes in HR priorities
and policies to preserve internal consistency (Lawler, 1986). And as these
adjustments are made, the organizations at some point become embroiled
in the evolution of an HR strategy, as earlier defined. This, then,
constitutes one group in the strategy fold.
To this group can be added a no doubt smaller number that have been,
and in some cases still are, involved in even more ambitious efforts.
These include several well-known cOrPOrations -- Bank of America, Corning
Glass Works, G.E., Kodak, Motorola, Polaroid, and Xerox, among others -
- whose paternalistically-oriented HR strategies (some would say cultures)
have proven to be unsustainable in the face of continuing competitive
pressures and depressed earnings. All are engaged in the struggle to
specify and implement more performance-oriented HR strategies corporate-
wide.
To these two groups of companies can be added a third, the
aforementioned firms that so far have maintained their basic HR strategies
through the turmoil -- e.g., such long-timers as IBM, Hewlett Packard,
Eli Lilly, Marion Laboratories, and Lincoln Electric and such Johnny-come-
latelies as Chaparral steel and Federal Express.
Taken together, these three groups probably represent the sum total
of the current action in the realm of HR strategy. Unfortunately, too
little is known about many of these efforts to permit full documentation
at this time. Nonetheless, some of the essence can be captured through
a more extensive look at a few specific examples.
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ILLUSTRATIVE HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGIES
Certainly, there is now more action in the HR strategy arena than
can be fully comprehended, let alone discussed, without resort to some
sort of typology or taxonomy to identify and define generic patterns.
Unfortunately, students of HR strategies (unlike those of business ~
strategies) have only just begun to tackle the needed research (DeBejer
and Milkovich, 1985; Dyer, 1984; Lawrence, 1985) and no generally accepted
typology or taxonomy has yet emerged.
So once again the frameworks presented in Figures 1 and 2 are called
into service. By applying these to available information on various HR
strategies, it is possible to identify a few prevailing patterns. For
purposes of illustration, three strategic types -- labelled inducement,
investment, and involvement -- are discussed in detail. As the discussion
proceeds, repeated reference is made to Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 which compare, ,
respectively, the relevant environmental conditions, goals, and means
associated with these three HR strategies.
-------------------------------
Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 about here
-------------------------------
It is not suggested that these particular strategies are either notably
prevalent or unusually promising; no such claims are possible given the
present state of knowledge. The purpose, rather, is to demonstrate just
a few of the ways in which various organizations are attempting to achieve
f
external and internal consistency in their HR priorities and policies,
at least among selected employee groups. (For a similar, although more
normatively oriented, exercise, see Walton [1985(b)].)
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THE INDUCEMENT STRATEGY
The origins of the inducement strategy trace to the work of the much-
maligned Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911), the father of scientific
management. Its evolution, however, probably owes more to the philosophies
of James B. Lincoln (1938), and particularly to the highly successful and
well-publicized application of his ideas at the Lincoln Electric Company
(Zager, 1978; Volard, 1982).
The environmental conditions giving rise to the inducement strategy
are outlined in the first column of Exhibit 3. The business environment
tends to be very competitive with firms competing largely on the basis
of low prices and/or the quality of their products or services. Oecision-
making power is highly centralized, although organizational structures
tend to be relatively flat (i.e., to have relatively few layers and wide
spans of control). The technology is traditional, simple, and only slowly
evolving. External environmental conditions are by and large benign,
although highly militant unions are not unheard of. Top managements pay
a good deal of attention to human resources, and particularly to the costs
of human resources. At Lincoln Electric, for example, management considers
employees the second most important stakeholder group in the organization,
just behind customers and well ahead of stockholders. At UPS, another
well-known inducer, it has been said that the "... ability to manage labor
and hold it accountable is the key to. [the company's] success" (Machalara,
1986, p. 1).
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Goals
With respect to contribution (as shown in Exhibit 4), the inducement
strategy is aimed first and foremost at encouraging reliable role behavior
at very high levels. There is at most only a modest level of concern about
employee initiative or flexibility. And no expectations of innovation,
creativity, or spontaneity.
Since cost is a major consideration, inducers seek to staff lean,
particularly with respect to overhead and staff jobs, and to hold down
the ratio of (comparatively) skilled to unskilled employees. This, too,
is a major HR goal.
Competence, in contrast, is a second order goal. While there is little
tolerance for incompetence, no attempt is made to develop employee skills
beyond levels required by current tasks.
Commitment is encouraged, although in most cases it is not a
preoccupation. And, at any rate, it is an instrumentally based commitment
(i.e., we pay, you stay), although some inducers -- most notably, again,
Lincoln Electric -- reinforce it with a touch of paternalism and a strict
no-layoff policy (Zager, 1978).
Means
Inducers are seldom cited as being on the "cutting-edge" of HRM.
They are by-and large unmoved by the successive waves of fads and falderol
that wash over the field. Their forte lies in getting the best out of
the basi--es.
The focal activity is pay (note the star in the first column of Exhibit
5). Notwithstanding a preoccupation with cost control, however, the thrust
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is not toward low wages or salaries. On the contrary, inducers offer
opportunities for very high earnings. But, the emphasis is on
opportunities. Inducers are among the most avid users of performance-based
pay schemes such as incentive pay, performance bonuses, gain-sharing, and
profit-sharing. In every way possible high pay is made contingent on
high levels of contribution.
At Lincoln Electric, for example, piece-rate plans are applied to
every possible job in the shop, even some classified as indirect labor,
and among the sales force. All other employees are on merit pay. Everyone
is part of a profit-sharing plan which distributes bonuses not on the basis
of earnings (as is customary), but on the basis of performance appraisal
ratings -- inducement style. In good years, which at Lincoln is most years,
the bonuses often match or exceed regular earnings; semi-skilled shop
workers can and do earn $40,000 a year or more. Also, many of Lincoln's
employees at all levels are stockholders as a result of a long-standing
and relatively generous stock purchase plan. Even at UPS where the
Teamsters union has resisted incentive pay, hourly rates exceed those of
most comparable firms and with overtime pay many drivers earn $35,000 to
$40,000 a year. There is also a profit-sharing plan and, for management,
a stock ownership plan.
But, even inducers do not rely on bread alone. Work systems are
carefully designed and managed; jobs tend to be narrowly defined and work
standards tightly controlled. Despite the general loathing of staff jobs
among inducers, UPS employs over 1,000 industrial engineers (the company
has 152,000 employees) with state-of-the-art electronic stopwatches and
computer programs to time and retime tasks and jobs and project appropriate
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performance standards.
Inducers using incentive pay plans deemphasize supervision (employees
are relied on to manage themselves), while the others give it a good deal
of attention. In either case, it tends to be directive.
"A sorter is
expected to handle 1,124 packages an hour and is allowed no more than one
mistake per 2,500 packages. UPS counts on strict supervision to overcome
the occasional human lapses" (Machalara, 1986, p.1).
Selection, while not central, is used to identify those who not only
can do the job, but will respond positively to and be comfortable with
the inducement strategy. Non-contributors are weeded out early. There
is little emphasis on career management, or on employee development. What
training is done tends to be task-oriented and carried out on the job.
Employee relations activities -- communication, voice, due process,
and employee assistance -- are not matters of major concern to inducers,
although there is a tendency to be egalitarian with respect to amenities
and perks. Unionized inducers seem to have strained relations with their
unions, particularly with respect to work systems and supervision (witness,
for example, the running war between UPS and the Teamsters). Government
relations tend toward compliance, nothing more.
THE INVESTMENT STRATEGY
The investment strategy has its origins in the welfare capitalism
of the 1920s, but also borrows ideas from the human relations movement
~f the forties and fifties and the more recent human capital theorists.
Its greatest success has come among start-up companies with intensely
paternalistic founders of longstanding influence. IBM, Hewlett Packard,
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and Eli Lilly are classic examples; Polaroid was.
As noted in the middle column of Exhibit 3, the business strategies
in these firms center around product or service differentiation (e.g.,
unique features, brand identification, or superior service) rather than
price which allows for relatively generous cost structures. Most --
although certainly not all -- are highly centralized and, until recently
at least, were relatively tall organizations with many layers of management.
state-of-the-art, and thus rapidly changing, technology is a common feature.
Investors worry more than inducers about evolving trends in external
environments. They rely on this information to help fashion personnel
policies and programs attractive to the highly trained talent their business
strategies and technologies demand, to maintain postures as good corporate
citizens, and to remain nonunion. Internally, top managements pay a good
deal of attention to HR matters and provide generous funding to back up
this concern.
Goals
When it comes to contribution, "excellence" is a common theme among
investors. Performance standards are high, although not excessively so,
and employees are expected routinely to exercise a fair amount of initiative
and creativity in carrying out their tasks (see the center column in Exhibit
4). Continual t~chnological change also requires a certain amount of
employee flexibility, especially since most investors eschew layoffs.
Competence is clearly the preferred path to achieving the desired
levels of employee contribution. Investors exhibit an unrelenting and
uncompromising preoccupation with employee quality. Attract and develop
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the best, they seem to say, and contribution will naturally follow.
Since this works only if employees stick around, attaining a high
level of employee commitment is also an important goal for investors.
And because of their full employment policies, so is composition.
The primary aim here is flexibility. As a result, many investors
deliberately overstaff a bit, both in terms of numbers and skill mixes,
and maintain relatively large staff groups (e.g., in personnel) to enhance
organizational adaptability. Recent events may be changing this situation,
however. Some investors are experiencing unprecedented levels of
competition and are finding that their biggest current HR challenge is
trying to figure out how to downsize without layoffs and without causing
declines in traditional levels of employee contribution, competence, and
commitment. (Which, if the competition continues, ultimately may call
into question the long-term viability of the investment strategy.)
Means
Investors are not, as is frequently assumed, the premiere practitioners
of McGregor's (1960) Theory Y style of people management. Rather, theirs
is a kid glove version of Theory X. Management establishes performance
and related standards and fashions the accompanying amenities. There is
close control. Employees are expected to exercise judgment and initiative
in their work, but investors do not advocate or encourage high levels of
employee participation in a wide range of firm affairs. Rather than
autonomy and involvement, the prevailing organizational values are personal
growth, respect, equity, justice, and security (Foulkes, 1981).
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The emphasis on employee competence naturally leads investors to be
big spenders on employee development (as indicated by one of the stars
in Exhibit 5). Much of the money goes toward employee socialization, but
a good deal is devoted to various types of skill-based training as well.
Employees at virtually all levels from managers on down are trained not
only for their current jobs, but also for future moves, and even, when
the time comes, for retirement. Much of the managerial and supervisory
training involves the essentials of effective people management, and
especially of employee relations. Companies such as IBM, G.E., Hewlett
Packard, and Eli Lilly are not about to have their carefully designed
employee relations programs undone by unthinking or uncaring managers and
supervisors.
Employee relations, it will be recalled from Exhibit 2, incorporates
four subactivities and it is the policy of investors to be on the "cutting
edge" of all four (Foulkes, 1981). They employ a wide variety of
communication media to bombard employees with both factual and symbolic
information. They also encourage an ongoing flow of information up the
organization through a range of voice mechanisms: opinion surveys, skip-
level meetings, sensing sesssions, and the like.
Further, they make every effort to assure that employees receive fair
treatment in all aspects of the employment relationship. And this concern
is solidly backed by due process mechanisms -- most commonly open doors,
"speak out" programs, and grievance procedures -- with teeth. Investors
are prominent providers of employee assistance programs, child care
programs, non-legislated family leaves, alternative work schedules, wellness
programs, nonsmoking policies, and company-sponsored social events. The
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message: investors care.
Along with employee development and employee relations, investors
emphasize staffing. Selection policies are designed to atttract not only
highly qualified employees, but also those with the "proper" values. Career
management and counseling programs emphasize long-term development within
the company. Extensive HR planning and ongoing coordination among external
and internal staffing and development activities are employed in the
interest of employment stabilization (Dyer, Foltman, and Milkovich, 1985).
Extra resources are allocated to government relations with a prevailing
policy of going well beyond the basic requirements in such areas as equal
employment opportunity, affirmative action, and safety and health. Again,
investors care.
In contrast, investors tend to downplay rewards. Most pay
competitively and, in keeping with their paternalistic tendencies, offer
attractive benefit packages. Merit pay may be used (although often
loosely) . But more hard-core incentive schemes, bonuses, and profit-sharing
plans are rare.
Work systems, as suggested earlier, receive relatively little attention
and are by-and-large traditional: jobs and performance standards are fairly
well defined, bosses boss and workers do. Supervision is ever-present
and supportive; basically it is viewed as a delivery system for employee
development and employee relations activities.
Labor relations tends to be a non-issue since most investors are
nonunion and rely on the other elements of their HR strategies to stay
that way.
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THE INVOLVEMENT STRATEGY
The involvement strategy contains vestiges of the human relations
movement, particularly its organizational offshoots (Likert, 1961), but
gains most of its theoretical justification from subsequent work on job
enrichment (Hackman and Oldham, 1980), quality of worklife programs (Mohrman
and Lawler, 1984), and industrial democracy. Because of its democratic
underpinnings, this is clearly the most highly touted HR strategy in the
current literature (see, for example, Lawler, 1986; Walton, 1985(b), 1986).
Applications include the aforementioned HR strategies at Chaparral Steel,
NUMMI, and Marion Laboratories. Another, which represents a conversion
rather than a start-up, is Motorola's well-known "participative management
program" (O'Toole, 1985; Weisz, 1985).
The involvement strategy has been tried, at least in part, in many
different types of organizations pursuing a number of different business
strategies. Its greatest success, however, seems to have come under two
rather diverse sets of circumstances. The first is in companies doing
business in highly competitive markets on the basis of low prices and/or
high quality (note the similarity with inducers). The second is in firms
pursuing business strategies that rely either on innovation to provide
continually differentiated products or services or on agility in moving
from niche to niche as markets change or competitors begin to catch up.
Both, but the latter in particular, tend to be relatively small,
decentralized companies or business units within larger companies with
either flat or unconventional (e.g., matrix) organizational structures,
and state-of-the-art flexible systems technology.
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The external environment is also a factor. Proponents argue that
the involvement strategy is particularly well-suited for today's highly
educated and narcissistic labor force, which presumably has great needs
to experience high levels of autonomy, challenge, and influence at work.
Despite the open hostility of many unions to the involvement strategy,
there have been a number of applications in unionized environments (Kochan,
et ai, 1986; Lawler, 1986). Internally, top managers tend to adopt a Theory
Y philosophy concerning the management of people and to back their beliefs
with at least moderate levels of funding for HR experimentation.
Goals
The major goal of the involvement strategy is to achieve a very high
level of employee commitment (indeed, one of its leading proponents calls
it the commitment strategy [Walton, 1985(b)]). What is sought is a deep
psychological commitment based on a close identification with the
organization, its mission, and its work (see Exhibit 4). This is quite
different from the more instrumentally-oriented commitment associated with
the inducement and investment strategies.
Of course, high levels of employee commitment are expected to result
in equally high levels of employee contribution. Contribution in this
context involves a good deal more than a high level of output on a
particular job. The goal is for employees at all levels to exercise
considerable initiative, creativity, and spontaneity in solving a wide
range of organizational problems, as well as a high degree of flexibility
in adapting to ongoing organizational change.
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This, in turn, requires very competent employees. As might be
expected, this is competence defined not in terms of a specific job, but
in terms of a full range of knowledge and skills, including problem-solving
and social skills, even at the lowest organizational levels.
Composition goals are generally downplayed in the involvement strategy,
although it is frequently suggested (and demonstrated in cases such as
Chaparral Steel) that adopters can operate with fewer levels of management
and smaller staff groups than would be possible under other HR strategies.
There may be offsetting differentials in headcounts at lower organizational
levels, however, and in the skill upgrades that occur at these levels.
Also, some overstaffing may be necessary to allow for the necessary training
and to achieve desired levels of organizational adaptability.
Means
The whole idea behind the involvement strategy is to enhance the power
and contribution of employees at all organizational levels by redistributing
authority, increasing both the downward and upward flow of work-related
information, and enhancing the knowledge base and skills of employees
(Lawler, 1986).
Not surprisingly, the work system is the main means through which
this is achieved (see Exhibit 5). The basic policy position is that all
decisions involving work goals and means should be driven down to the lowest
feasible level. In practice, this tFanslates in limited cases into job
enrichment and in more extensive applications into the formation of
semiautonomous work groups and self-managed work teams (for a working
example, see Frohman [1984]). It may also involve the liberal use of task
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forces and other such temporary groups not only to accomplish work (often
work that would otherwise be done by staff functions), but also to foster
maximum participation and involvement. Accompanying features are such
things as flex-work and flex-time which also enhance employee control over
the work situation.
Supervision is another key element in the involvement strategy,
particularly in the early going. The key concept is facilitation. The
role of supervisors at all levels is to assist subordinates in the creation
and communication of missions and goals for their units, in the proper
allocation of decisions, and in decision-making by providing information,
encouraging openness and trust, and lending support (Lawler, 1986). Social
control is provided primarily through peer pressure rather than supervisory
direction.
Since participation and facilitation are beyond the usual experience
of many employees and supervisors, involvers usually find it necessary
to do considerable training and development, particularly when such a
strategy is first adopted. Much of the emphasis is on problem-solving,
interpersonal, and group facilitation skills, and on economic and financial
knowledge, rather than on more traditional job skills and knowledge.
While work design, supervision, and development are central to the
success of the involvement strategy, other HR activities are made to be
supportive. Careful selection, for example, is used to assure that those
hired possess skills (or at least aptitudes) and attitudes consistent with
the demands of the involvement strategy. Careers are redefined in terms
of skill growth and cross-functional movement to overcome reduced
opportunities for upward mobility, and career counseling is used to
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communicate and facilitate this concept. Layoffs are mimimized for
philosophical reasons, but also in an attempt to protect investments in
employees and enhance organizational adaptability.
With their heavy emphasis on so-called intrinsic rewards, involvers
have tended to deemphasize the role of pay and benefits. Increasingly,
however, experience suggests that this policy eventually bumps up against
the philosophical (and actual) inconsistency of spreading responsibility
without enhancing payoffs. For this reason, many involvers have become
more sophisticated in the use of compensation; examples of innovations
include skill-based pay, which rewards employees for learning new skills
and jobs, gain-sharing, and tying payoffs to long-term corporate earnings
through profit sharing and stock ownership plans (Milkovich, in press).
Bonuses, for example, are an integral part of Motorola's "participative
management system" (Weisz, 1985).
Involvers downplay employee relations. It is apparently assumed that
participation in forums for discussing and deciding on work related issues
obviates the need for employee relations oriented communication or special
voice programs. And that employee involvement is somehow incompatable
with the emergence of personal grievances or problems, thus making due
process and employee assistance programs less central than they are, for
example, in the investment strategy. Nevertheless, it is recognized that
participation and involvement are inconsistent with status differentials,
and so egalitarianism is practiced with respect to the provision of
amenities and perks. Indeed, participation often starts around these
issues.
involvement strategies share very few common priorities or policies (high
performance standards and careful selection are about the only two
exceptions). Yet, it is clear that each of the three (and probably many
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While most involvers, as others, would no doubt prefer to be nonunion,
the involvement strategy, as noted, is not inconsistent with unionization.
Its implementation in an unionized environment, however, requires a level
of union-management cooperation and trust that typically takes much effort
to achieve (Kochan, et ai, 1986; Lawler, 1986).
Involvers do not stress government relations and, indeed, they can
experience difficulties in maintaining compliance with equal employment
opportunity and affirmative action legislation if and when participation
is extended to decisions about hiring, promotions, and the allocation of
training opportunities and rewards.
As these brief descriptions show, the inducement, investment, and
others) can be made to work when carefully fitted to the prevailing
composite of business strategy, organizational structure, technology, and
external and internal environmental conditions and molded into a coherent
and synergistic whole. Obviously, then, the current rhetoric (Lawler,
1986; Walton, 1985(b), 1986) notwithstanding, there is no one best HR
strategy. However much the practitioners and students of HRM might wish
otherwise, the inescapable conclusion has to be: What is best, "depends".
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE PERSONNEL FUNCTION
Thus, it is no cinch to conquer the complexities of strategic HRM.
Among other things, it usually involves significant changes in the
prevailing priorities and practices of personnel departments and the
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professionals who staff them. The simple prescription, obvious but oft-
stated, is that both must become more strategic in their thoughts and
actions. But, what does this mean? What specifically are the implications
for the personnel function? For personnel professionals? And how prepared
are they to meet these challenges?
Some preliminary answers to these questions can be provided by drawing
on the experiences of the companies that have adopted or are in the process
of adopting the strategic perspective.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERSONNEL FUNCTION
The recommended role for the personnel function is that of "strategic
partner" (Holder, 1986). As generally described this role has four aspects.
First, top corporate and divisional personnel executives take the lead
in working with their line counterparts to formulate and from time to time
review broad HR strategies (inducement, investment, involvement, or
whatever) appropriate to their organizations. Second, top corporate
personnel executives fully participate in all business strategy sessions
at the corporate level on a par with chief financial officers, general
counsels, and subsidiary operating heads (Levine, 1986), while personnel
managers down the line operate in a similar fashion with divisional and
functional managements. This permits an early evaluation of proposals
in terms of their feasibility and desirability from an HR perspective as
well as an early warning of upcoming HR issues. But, the participation
occurs routinely and is not limited to situations in which it is known
in advance that HR issues are at stake (McLaughlin, 1986).
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A third aspect is that personnel executives, managers, and specialists
work closely with line managers on an ongoing basis to assure that business
strategies, including but not limited to their HR components, are adequately
implemented. And fourth, the personnel function itself is managed
strategically; that is, it has its own departmental strategy which lays
out priorities, directs the allocation of resources, and guides the work
of various subfunctional specialists.
No doubt this concept of strategic partnership has been fully
implemented in only a handful of firms. In others where the strategic
perspective is taking hold, however, it is being pursued in a number of
ways.
Some personnel executives and managers, for example, have taken it
upon themselves to formulate broad HR strategies suitable for their
organizations. They then use these visions at every opportunity to guide
and influence the decision-making of top line executives on HR policy
matters. others have worked to heighten line managements' awareness of
HR issues and to assure that these executives seek professional expertise
whenever such issues arise in their strategic deliberations. Still others
have gained for themselves the right of review and concurrence over any
and all strategic moves and plans prior to implementation as part of the
formal strategic planning process (Dyer and Heyer, 1986).
The basic goal of these personnel executives and managers is to
exercise leadership in all matters having to do with HR strategy and policy.
They constantly search for ways in which their organizations might achieve
or enhance a competitive advantage through better people management (Schuler
and McMillan, 1984; Schuler and Jackson, 1987(a)}. They call into question
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the wisdom of business strategies that appear to be at risk because of
potential HR problems. When strategic business directions change, they
take the lead to assure that time is spent evaluating the continued
relevance of broad HR strategies and, if necessary, in making changes.
In addition, personnel executives exercise leadership within their
own functions in the interest of developing more strategic orientations.
strategic teams are formed to analyze the content of business and HR
strategies, to evaluate the relevant strengths and weaknesses of the
function, and, ultimately, to formulate an appropriate functional (or
departmental) strategy. While a wide variety of issues are addressed in
such strategies (Kanter and Buck, 1985), at a minimum they usually include
a mission statement, a set of prioritized goals for the function and the
major subfunctions (e.g., employment, training, compensation), a proposed
organization structure -- decentralization is cornman these days -- and
a program portfolio to outline priorities and policies, and ultimately
a budget to address the issue of resource allocation. This broad framework
is then used by the various subfunctions, or by cross-subfunctional teams,
as guides for program development and improvement.
Bringing strategy within the personnel function also has the effect
of altering the way in which it defines and measures success. Form --that
is, program elegance or process counts (such as number of managers trained)
-- gives way to substance --particularly, the nature of the contribution
that is being made toward the achievement of HR goals and, in the longer
run, to the success of the organization's business strategies (see Chapter
V of this volume).
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In brief, personnel executives and managers that have adopted the
strategic perspective are attempting to demonstrate what Mills (1985,
Chapter 15) calls "value added"; that is, to show through word and deed
that they and their functions are capable of thinking and operating
strategically and that this capability can and does make a difference to
the organization's bottom line.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONNEL PROFESSIONALS
As this type of thinking begins to permeate through a personnel
function, its members come to view their work in quite different ways.
They begin to evolve into what Holder (1986) has elsewhere referred to
as "Type A" personnel professionals. They become more business-oriented;
that is, they learn to apply their professionalism to key business issues
and work with line managers as business partners, helping to find solutions
that contribute to the well-being of (or inflict the least hurt on) all
organizational stakeholders, including employees. They also become more
future-oriented, more proactive, broader in focus (the dysfunctionality
of defending one's subfunctional turf becomes clearer), and more willing
to take risks.
Obviously, changes of this type can be traumatic for personnel
executives, managers, and specialists who are trained and experienced in
more traditional ways. Some have found and others are finding it necessary
to acquire a whole new set of knowledge and skills (Murphy, 1986).
Priority areas with respect to new knowledge include: an understanding
of business and organizational environments -- markets, customers, products, /
services, finances, structures, and technologies; an appreciation of the
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contributions various organizational units are expected to make to broader
business strategies and the major problems and obstacles that those who
manage and operate these units face; a firm enough grasp of major trends
in various components of the external environment -- labor unions,
legislation, and labor markets -- to ascertain their significance for
proposed business or HR strategies; and a thorough enough understanding
of various elements of the internal environment -- ongoing personnel
problems, dominant management values concerning human resources, and
resource restrictions -- to give them just due in the formulation of HR
and functional strategies. In addition, some personnel specialists find
it necessary to broaden their views of the activities they perform and
to develop a fuller appreciation of the ways in which these fit into the
bigger picture.
For those at or near the top it helps to be visionary or, perhaps
more realistically, to develop planning and analytical skills that can
help bring business and HR components together in meaningful ways. (Casual
observation suggests that more than a few personnel executives and managers
have seen their strategic aspirations founder because their planning and
analytical skills were inferior to those of their line counterparts.)
Diagnostic skills are important since quick fixes, gimmicks, and a follow-
the-leader mentality can no longer be relied upon (McLaughlin, 1986).
other consulting skills also come in handy not only during the formulation
of strategies, but also during their implementation. Another key attribute
(not exactly a skill) is flexibility, since compromises are inevitable;
it is not always easy for personnel people to think in terms of what is
best for the business instead of what is optimal from an HR point of view
The rest of the non-starters fall in this group largely of their own
volition. Some, it is known, are holding back because they are either
unsure of what to do or unsure of their ability to do it. And, so far
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(Holder, 1986). And, finally, as the stakes become higher there is a need
for a concomitant ability to assess and face up to risks.
Quite clearly, then, much is involved in the shift to the strategic
perspective and the stakes are high.
STATE OF THE PRACTICE
Unfortunately, no one knows what proportions of personnel functions
or professionals are accomplished, aspiring, or abstaining strategists.
Quite clearly, there are some in all three categories. A few, as earlier
noted, have completed the transition and some have been operating
strategically for years (Burdick, 1986). Many others, the current commotion
would suggest, whether eagerly or reluctantly, are struggling with the
transition and learning as they go (Hoerr, 1985). Many more are undoubtedly
non-starters.
The non-starters probably fall into two categories. The first includes
those that are in situations where this is the only rational course of
action. It incorporates the functions and professionals, for example,
located in organizations dominated by "paper entrepeneurs" whose
preoccupation with buying and selling "properties" precludes any interest
in operations. And those that are in organizations so engrossed with the
here and now that any type of strategic thinking is at best tomorrow's
dream.
at least, they have been fortunate enough not to have been called upon
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by their managements to playa more strategic role. Many, no doubt, are
persuaded that the call will never come and that the strategy kick, as
so many fads before, will soon lose its luster.
Which way will events go? Will the strategy paradigm continue to
gain momentum and eventually come to dominate the practice and study of
HRM? Or is it, after all, just another passing fancy?
A LOOK AHEAD
A look ahead shows that some forces will continue to push HRM toward
the strategic perspective, while others will have the opposite effect.
The outcome is far from certain, but on balance the former seem to have
the upper hand. The result is likely to be a continuing stream of cautious
forays into strategic HRM which, when combined with the current activity,
may eventually give this paradigm a dominant position within the field.
FORCES FAVORING THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
On the business side, virtually everyone expects the competitive
pressures that built up during the late seventies and through the eighties
to continue building into the nineties. Protectionist legislation and
reregulation may offer temporary respite for a few firms in selected
industries --the larger steel companies, for example, and the airlines
-- but most of the others will continue to face stiff competition from
a variety of both domestic and foreign companies (Choate and Linger, 1986).
This is true not only in the manufacturing sector where considerable
progress toward global competitiveness has already been made (see, for
example, Treece, 1987), but also in the service sector where the process
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is only now beginning (Quinn and Gagnon, 1986).
Restructurings and downsizings are expected to continue, although
of necessity they will be fewer in number and, usually, of less massive
proportions than those of the past decade (Anonymous, New York Times, 23
August 1987). Freezes and cuts in pay and benefits will continue to tempt
hard-pressed employers. But, they will find these measures increasingly
difficult to attain and sustain as the backlash against the continuing
erosion of living standards intensifies and as serious labor shortages
emerge in certain occupations and areas of the country (Bernstein, Anderson
and Zellner, 1987; Fullerton and Tschetter, 1983). Many firms, therefore,
will be searching for life after the slashing is over and will be in need
of slightly more creative ways to attain essential increases in
productivity, product and service quality, and organizational innovation
and adaptability. Because this process has already worked its way through,
or been short-circuited in, a few companies, it is easy to see that,
inevitably, these searches will primarily concentrate on some mixture of
technology and HRM (Anonymous, Business Week, 13 February 1984; Drucker,
1986).
Technologists will continue to discover, however slowly and painfully,
the absolute necessity of dealing with the human side of their systems
both in terms of hardware and software design and subsequent installation
and operation (Hoerr, et ai, 1986; Howard, 1985; Hunt and Hunt, 1983; Pava,
1985; Walton, 1985(a». But, they, and the managements they serve, will
need help here. Further, it will continue to become obvious that some
situations simply will not yield to technological solutions (at least in
the foreseeable future), and the only answer will lie in better organization
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and management and in learning how to use the full capacity of every
employee of every level and type. Help will be needed here, also.
Thus, developments in the business and organizational environments
will simply go on creating a series of critical HR issues that will be
difficult to ignore and unlikely to to yield to traditional piecemeal
solutions. And, in some cases, these will be further complicated by a
couple of already noticeable trends in the external environment.
One, previously alluded to, comes in the form of impending shortages
in certain sectors of the labor market (Bernstein, et ai, 1987). Over
the next few years the growth of the labor force will be slowing
significantly. In particular, the number of 16-24 year olds will actually
decline each year between now and 1995 (Fullerton and Tschetter, 1983).
This, of course, means fewer high school and college graduates, exacerbating
already existing shortages in fields such as science and engineering.
It also means that the deficiences in many of our public school systems
will become less easy to ignore. An increasing number of employers,
particularly in potentially high-growth areas such as high tech and some
parts of the service sector (e.g., restaurants, hotels, retail stores,
hospitals, nursing homes, banks, and insurance companies) will find
themselves facing some difficult decisions.
Essentially, they will be choosing between significantly altering
or even abandoning otherwise sound business strategies and taking on
employees they have previously shunned, including some portion of the
million or so youngsters who each year drop out of school or graduate ill-
prepared to do even the simplest tasks (Choate and Linger, 1986). Fair
to say that a good many executives and managers are themselves ill-prepared
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to make this choice or to deal with the consequences of pushing ahead.
They will need, and perhaps even want, help in coming to grips with the
issues involved.
The second complication emanating from the external environment, more
limited in its effect, emerges from a significant shift in strategy among
some labor unions. A few, most notably the trend-setting United Auto
Workers, have been, and will continue to, use their clout to wedge
themselves into the strategy and policy-making nexus of the companies with
which they deal (Kochan, et al, 1986). This has two effects. First, it
forces a more systematic approach to strategy-making than otherwise would
be the case. And second, it necessarily complicates this process, making
it more difficult to forge workable business and, particularly, supporting
HR strategies (Bernstein and Zellner, 1987; Schlesinger, 1987). Witness,
for example, the well-publicized events within General Motors' Saturn
project. This area represents the "frontier" of labor-management relations
(Kochan, et al, 1986, p. 17) and it will not yield to traditional solutions.
The accumulation of these business, organizational, and environmental
pressures, of course, does not assure the emergence of carefully considered
HR strategies. There are, after all, some powerful forces pushing in other
directions.
FORCES RETARDING THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
Probably the most powerful of the countervailing forces is top
management. The easy nuts, one assumes, have been cracked; the rest
undoubtedly neither know of nor have any reason to think they need HR
strategy. Some (the "paper entrepeneurs") have little or no interest in
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operations, others have what they perceive to be more pressing problems,
and still others feel no more obligation to employees than to provide
today's job today. All will be hard sells. Even when HR issues cannot
be avoided, many will simply activate their well-fed addictions to the
quick fix.
It is unlikely that many of these executives and managers will
encounter a groundswell of countermanding forces from within their
organizations. In most cases, this would have to come from their personnel
functions, and, as previously noted, many personnel executives and managers
now lack, and do not appear to be developing, the knowledge, skills, and
risk-taking propensity that this would require.
And this hesitancy cannot be considered totally baseless. While the
virtues of the strategic approach are thoroughly extolled in the advocacy
literature, with only a few exceptions (see, for example, DeBejer and
Milkovich [1985]), the supportive empirical evidence consists entirely
of a small number of anecdotal case studies (most of which have been cited
herein). Theorists and researchers are a long way from demonstrating beyond
even a reasonable doubt that the potential rewards of this approach to
HRM are worth the considerable costs involved. This, too, is an inhibiting
factor.
Another has to do with anticipated developments in the legal arena.
A backlash is building as a result of the human costs of the economic
restructuring that has already occurred and the relative inaction of the
Reagan administration. Congress, backed by organized labor, is beginning
to generate a spate of new legislation and even some interest in enforcement
(Hughey, 1987), to go with the continuing initiatives from the states and
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the courts. While much of the impending action is unlikely to have
strategic consequences (save perhaps plant closing legislation), it will
probably provide a convenient and comfortable diversion for personnel
practitioners who are otherwise disinclined to move further into business
issues or all the way into HR strategy.
THE LIKELY OUTCOME
What is the likely outcome of all this pulling and tugging? The
pioneers and their early camp-followers will continue to forge ahead, and
those that learn to turn HRM to a competitive advantage will find themselves
far ahead. The pressure will continue to build on many of the others,
particularly in the service sector, as intensifying competitive pressures
continue to expose the high costs of HR mismanagement, the initial knee-
jerk reactions prove to be inadequate, and the successes of the leading-
edge companies receive even greater publicity. Under this pressure, or
in anticipation of it, a larger number of personnel professionals will
become familiar with the precepts of strategic HRM and the result will
be an ongoing wave of cautious experimentation with strategy that
conceivably might, at its height, reach half the medium-sized and larger
organizations in the country.
Because of the continuing need to become cost competitive (and the
drying up of the downsizing and pay cut options), much of this
experimentation will focus on traditional concepts of productivity. But,
since the U.S. can hardly aspire to being the low cost producer of much
of anything, most businesses will be forced, as many already have been,
into business strategies focusing on product or service differentiation
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(in extreme cases, for example, there may even be some service forthcoming
from the service sector) and/or niche marketing. Thus, productivity will
have to mean much more than simply efficiency.
As a result, there will be a need for management to define employee
contributions increasingly in terms of innovativeness, creativity,
spontaneity, and flexibility. Organizational structures and even
technologies will become increasingly malleable and flexible, as will the
utilization of employees (Choate and Linger, 1986; Reich, 1983; Piore and
Sabel, 1984). There will be a much greater use of "disposable employees"
(Pollock and Bernstein, 1986). Traditional organizational expectations
of employee commitment and loyalty will continue to be rethought (as will
traditional employee expectations of organizational commitment and loyalty,
a process some say is already underway as a result of the massive cutbacks
and layoffs that have occurred).
All of these changes hold great potential for creating a monumental
backlash among employees and, ultimately, society. Modest signs of this
are already evident in the current legislative and legal developments
previously noted and in some of the recent successes of the labor movement
(Kotlowitz, 1987). How far all this goes will depend on two things: First,
on how successful businesses are in generating competitiveness and
profitability (there is a genuine reluctance to annoy, let alone stick,
a golden goose no matter how offensive) and second, the quality of the
actions employers take to offset the negative aspects of restructuring
and recalibrating. In brief, much depends on the ability of HR
professionals to help generate and implement high quality HR strategies.
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Consultants and academics, attracted by the glitter if not the gold,
can be expected to follow -- and attempt to act on -- these developments
with great interest and, indeed, gusto. As a result, professional journals
and magazines will take on even more of a strategic hue (thus feeding the
nascent applications). As consensus begins to emerge, textbooks will come
to be organized around one or another of a small number of strategic
perspectives. Useful research results will begin to emerge. And for a
while, maybe even a long while, strategy may well provide the dominant
and integrative paradigm that has thus far eluded the practice and study
of HRM.
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EXHIBIT 1
HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY
GOALS
CONTRIBUTION: Refers to an organization's individual or group behavior
and performance goals. Some organizations seek little more than reliable
role behavior (coming to work on time and doing what is assigned), while
others attempt to attain a modicum of initiative, creativity and flexi-
bility, and still others expect a high degree of innovative, creative
and even spontaneous behavior and flexibility (Katz and Kahn). In any
of these situations, performance expectations may rank from relatively
modest to very high.
COMPOSITION: Refers to an organization's headcount, staffing ratio, and
skill mix goals. At any given point, some organizations choose to run
fat, others lean; some attempt to staff up, others down; some try to en-
hance staff groups, others to pare them; some seek to increase the ratio
of (say) engineers to technicians, others to decrease it.
COMPETENCE: Refers to the general level of ability an organization
wishes to attain among various groups of employees. Some attempt to
attain only the barest minimum required by the jobs at hand, others a
close match between ability and job requirements, and still others a work
force that is generally overqualified.
COMMITMENT: Refers to the general level of employee attachment sought
and the degree of identification with organization goals desired. Some
seek only a casual attachment of a strictly instrumental (work for out-
comes) nature, others a moderate degree of attachment based on both in-
strumental and emotional ties, and still others a high degree of attach-
ment and a nearly total identification with the organization and/or its
goals.
EXHIBIT 2
HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY
MEANS
STAFFING: The process of matching people with jobs. Involves the use of
both external and internal staffing mechanisms. Some policy issues involve
the relative amount of emphasis to be put on external and internal staffing,
the stringency of selection standards, the amount of effort to be put into
career management, and whether or not layoffs are to be used when cutbacks
are called for.
DEVELOPEMENT: The process of enhancing the knowledge, skills, and abilities
of employees. Some policy issues involve the amount of emphasis to be put
on development and the choice of means to do that which will be done (e.g.,
on or off the job).
REWARDS: The process of paying employees or providing them with special
forms of rcognition. Some policy issues involve the general level of pay to
be offered, the steepness of pay structure(s), the bases for determining pay
(e.g., seniority or merit), and the types and levels of benefits to be
provided.
WORK SYSTEM: The process of designing jobs and workplaces. Some policy issues
involve whether employees are to work primarily individually or in teams,
whether jobs or team assignments are to be narrow or broad (enriched), and the
degree of control employees are to exercise over the work.
SUPERVISION AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT:. The process of directing and evalua-
ting the work of others. Some policy issue involve the amount of emphasis to
be placed on supervision (vs. self-management), the closeness of the super-
vision to be provided, and the role of supervisors (e.g., director, supporter,
facilitator) .
EMPLOYEEE RELATIONS: The process of providing support to employees. Four
areas are involved: communication, voice (avenues for upward communication),
due process (means of redressing grievances), and employee assistance (for
such things as alcohol and drug abuse, family problems, etc.). Since these
are all pretty much optional (in nonunion settings), a major policy issue in-
volves whether to do them at all. If this is affirmative, others involve ex-
tensiveness and types of activities.
LABOR RELATIONS: The process of dealing with unions or the threat of unioni-
zation where present. In the former case, some policy issues involve the
nature of the relationship to seek with the union(s) (e.g., adversarial or
cooperative) and how much cooperative behavior to engage in outside the formal
bargaining relationship. In the latter, the major policy issue involves the
amount of effort to put into staying nonunion.
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS: The process of dealing with governmental regulators
and, where necessary, the courts. Some policy issues involve the amount of
effort to put into complying with existing legislation and regulations (e.g.,
non-compliance, basic compliance, over-compliance [model citizen]) and how
much to put into lobbying to affect existing or proposed legislation and
regulations.
EXHIBIT 3
ENVIRONMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONDITION INDUCEMENT
HR STRATEGY
INVESTMENT
.Business Strategy
INVOLVEMENT
.Organizational
Structure
.Technology
8Labor Supply
.Legislation
.Labor Unions
.Mgmt Philosophy
.Resources for HR
.Based on Price and/or
Quality
.Flat, Centralized
.Traditional,
Evolutionay Change
.Adequate
.Sometimes
.Much Attention to
HR (Cost)
.Low
.Based on Differentia-
tion: Quality,
Features, Service, etc.
.Tall, Centralized
.Modern, Somewhat
Rapid Change
.Somewhat Tight
.Hardly Even
.Much Attention to
HR, Paternalistic
.High
'Based on Innovation,
Flexibility
.Flat, Decentralized, many
Task Forces, Small Units
.Varies
.Somewhat Tight
.Sometimes
.Much Attention to
HR, Theory Y
-Intermediate

EXHIBIT 5
MEANS
HR STRATEGY
MEANS INDUCEMENT INVOLVEMENTINVESTMENT
.Staffing .Careful Selection, few
Career Options, Use of
Temps, (Minimal Layoffs)
.Development .Minimal
.Rewards *Flat Structure, High-
Variable, Piece-Rate
Profit Sharing, Minimal
Benefits
.Work System .Narrow Jobs, Employee
Paced, Individualized
.Supervision .Minimal, Directive
8E@, Relations .Some Communication, Some
Voice, Egalitarian
.Labor Relations .Union Avoidance, or
Conflict
.Govt. Relations .Compliance
*Indicates priority program areas.
*Careful Selection, Ex-
tensive Career Develop-
ment, Some Flex, Minimal
(or no) Layoffs
*Extensive, Continuous
Learning
.Careful Selection, Some
Career Development, Much
Flex, Minimal (or no)
Layoffs
*Extensive, Continuous
Learning
.Tall Structure, Competi- .Flat Structure, High-
tive-Fixed, Job Based, Partially Variable,
Merit, Many Benefits Skill-Based, Gain-Sharing,
Flex Benefits
.Broad Jobs, Employee
Initiative, Some Groups
.Extensive, Supportive
*Much Communication, High
Voice, High Due Process,
High Ee Assistance
.Non-Issue
*Over-Compliance
*Enriched Jobs, Self-
Managed Work Teams
*Minimal, Facilitative
.Much Communication, High
Voice~ Some Due Process,
Some Ee Assistance,
Egalitarian
.Union Avoidance, and or
Cooperative
.Compliance
